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For ceos**
abstract
We show theoretically and empirically that Pay-for-Performance, like many manage-
ment fashions, has not achieved its intended aim. our research focuses on previous 
empirical studies that examine the relation between variable executive pay and firm 
performance on various different dates. our results indicate that a variable ceo income 
contributes very little to the increase of the firm’s performance, and that ceo salary and 
firm performance are not linked. the example of Pay-for-Performance shows that in the 
long run, many management fashions do not solve the problems that they promise to 
solve.
JeL classifications: g35, o31, J41.
Keywords: ceo compensation; corporate governance; crowding out; management 
fashion; Pay-for-Performance.
  
1 the rise oF the ManageMent “Fashion” Pay-For-PerForMance
Management fashions promise solutions for problems that are considered urgent. “A 
management fashion (…) is a relatively transitory collective belief, disseminated by 
management fashion setters, that a management technique leads rational management 
progress.” (Abrahamson (1996)). Examples of management fashions of the last few years 
are Business Process Reengineering, ISO 9000 ff., Lean Management, Downsizing, Share-
holder Value, Empowerment, Core Competences, Corporate Culture and Open Inno-
vation (Kieser (2000; 2002); Teichert and Talaulicar (2002)). Management fashions sell 
management concepts (Kieser (1996; 1997). These concepts are supposed to structure and 
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settle problems that are considered urgent and worth solving at a certain time. History 
shows that management fashions occur in ever faster succession (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Development of management fashions (Ghemawat (2000, 25))
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Many management fashions develop and survive despite doubts about their effective-
ness, or if they are later shown to be dysfunctional (Sterman and Wittenberg (1999)). 
At times, management fashions even penetrate domains for which they have not been 
designed. A particularly dramatic example of this development is Pay-for-Perfor-
mance.
The goal of Pay-for-Performance is to compensate staff according to their individual 
and specific performance, thus motivating them to further efforts. The concept follows 
the idea of piece rate. The Safelite Glass Company is a prominent example. After the 
change from fixed pay rates per hour to piece rates, which were measured according to 
assembled glass units per worker and day, productivity rose by an astonishing 36%, the 
incentive effect by 20% and the self-selection effect by 16%, while salary cost only rose 
by 9% (Lazear (1999); Backes-Gellner et al. (2001); Wolff and Lazear (2001); Besanko 
et al. (2004)). The company transferred this piece-rate concept to managers without 
Pay-for-Performance
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questioning whether their work was comparable to work done at the assembly line. 
CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance is intended to link the interests of the owners with the inter-
ests of the CEOs (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The aim is to motivate the CEO to act 
like the owner of the firm even in situations which he cannot monitor, e.g., during nego-
tiations1. Pay-for-Performance embodies nearly all the components of a management 
fashion (Kieser (1996; 1997); Benders and van Veen (2001)):
It is perceived as new, progressive, innovative, rational, and functional (Carson et al. 
(2000)). 
It promises to solve an acute problem, i.e., the incompetence of the board of directors 
(Galbraith (1967); Mace (1971); Allen (1974); Herman (1981)). At the beginning of 
the 1960s, shareholders questioned the effectiveness of monitoring by the board and 
claimed that the board's influence on the decisions by management was limited. 
A key factor of the Pay-for-Performance program is heavily promoted and a simple 
transposition is suggested. In this case, the linking of the different interests of share-
holders and management by means of monetary compensation dependent on perfor-
mance (Jensen and Murphy (1990b)). 
Fashion-setters such as gurus, mass media, or business schools interact as suppliers with 
the demanding enterprises (Abrahamson (1991; 1996); Abrahamson and Fairchild 
(1999)). 
Consultants grasp the concept and promise an enormous improvement of efficiency 
(Schiltknecht (2004); Schütz (2005)).
Pay-for-Performance soon became as popular in practice as it was in research. More and 
more often, companies in stock markets replaced the prevailing fixed salaries of CEOs 
with variable performance pay components such as bonus, option, and share programs. 
American corporations acted as the pioneers. Indeed, in the beginning, Pay-for-Perform-
ance showed positive effects. The variable part of a CEO’s salary in 1993 was 37% and 
rose in 2003 to 57% (Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005)). In 2005, the variable part of a 
CEO’s salary in Switzerland was 59%, in Germany 57%, in Austria 50%, and in the 
United States 81% (Piazza (2006)). In research, the number of published articles in the 
Web of Science on Pay-for-Performance has greatly increased since 2002 (see Figure 2). The 
causes for the increasing popularity of Pay-for-Performance are unsolved corporate govern-
ance problems in modern stock corporations. 
1 Eccles (1985); Eisenhardt (1985; 1989); Jensen and Murphy (1990a); Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992); Wel-
bourne et al. (1995); Fernie and Metcalf (1996); Henderson and Fredrickson (1996); Core et al. (1999); Tosi et 
al. (2000).
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Figure 2: Increase of publications regarding Pay-for-Performance
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In this article we argue that like many management fashions, Pay-for-Performance for 
CEOs, not only fails to satisfy the anticipated expectations, but also turns out to be 
dysfunctional. In section 2 we present the arguments of the proponents of Pay-for-
Performance systems. In section 3 we present our empirical findings and theoretical argu-
ments for the counterproductive effect of Pay-for-Performance. In section 4 we show our 
methods and results of our meta-analysis. In section 5 we question why the Pay-for-Perfor-
mance fashion not only persist, but even penetrate domains in which even the fashion 
setters did not intend them to occur.
2 arguMents in Favor oF the Pay-For-PerForMance systeM 
The basic idea of Pay-for-Performance is built on standard microeconomics, in particular 
on the principal agent view proposed by Jensen and Murphy (1990b). These theories build 
on the model of the self-interested ‘homo oeconomicus,’ accepting as a matter of course 
that “cash compensation should be structured to provide big rewards for outstanding 
performance and meaningful penalties for poor performance” (Jensen and Murphy 
(1990b)); in other words; that interests between the agent and the principal can be aligned 
via highly contingent, long-term incentives.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that interest alignment via monetary incentives can 
solve agency problems. The typical publicly traded commercial organizations in most 
Western countries has a corporate structure with hundreds, thousands, or even millions 
of owners, each having a small claim on the firm (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). These 
widely dispersed shareholders delegate the responsibility of running the business to hired 
professional CEOs, who act on behalf of absentee firm owners in exchange for compensa-
tion packages. However, the interests of professional managers may not necessarily coin-
cide with those of absent owners (Berle and Means (1932)). Ideally, the financiers and the 
Pay-for-Performance
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managers would sign a complete contract. The trouble is that most future contingencies are 
hard to foresee and describe, and as a result, complete contracts are technologically infea-
sible. Because of these problems in designing their contract, the manager and the financier 
must allocate the residual control rights that allow the manager to make decisions in circum-
stances not fully foreseen by the contract. Thus, managers end up with significant control 
rights (managerial discretion) over how to allocate investors’ funds. Managers can expro-
priate shareholders by entrenching themselves and staying on the job even if they are no 
longer competent or qualified to run the firm (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Poor managers 
who resist being replaced might be the costliest manifestation of the agency problem (Jensen 
and Ruback (1983)). Further, managerial opportunism, whether in the form of expropria-
tion of investors or of misallocation of company funds, reduces the amount of resources that 
investors are willing to put up ex ante to finance the firm (Williamson (1985)).
Thus, shareholders can motivate CEOs by controlling their incentives (Eisenhardt (1989); 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992)) because an optimal incentive contract makes the agent’s 
compensation (and thus the agent’s utility) contingent on outcomes desired by the prin-
cipal, i.e., expected performance (Fong and Tosi (2007)). Incentive contracts can take a 
variety of forms, including share ownership or stock options, with the aim of awarding the 
CEO according to his/her individual and specific performance. The core message is that 
a person who acts in the interest of another person will be rewarded2.
Agency theory proposes that organizations choose between fixed and variable pay by deter-
mining how easy it is to monitor behavior. For shareholders, the actions of CEOs are not 
directly observable. CEOs work in less structured jobs, in highly turbulent organizations, 
and in work environments that encourage short-term work relationships. Therefore, CEOs 
should receive a higher proportion of their compensation in the form of variable pay than 
other workers (Stroh et al. (1996)). 
3 arguMents that oPPose the Pay-For-PerForMance systeM
Here, we present the arguments for why Pay-for-Performance for CEOs not only does 
not achieve its targets, it may even worsen the conflicts between shareholders, staff, and 
management. 
3.1	 Empirical	Findings
Despite the ongoing popularity of Pay-for-Performance, firm owners (Minder (2007)), 
researchers3, publishers (Schwarz (2006)) and board members (Krauer (2004); Amstutz 
2 By depicting compensation as a reward for performance, finance scholars are interested in the ex post settling up 
of contracts (Fama (1980)). “The principal-agent (…) model provides a compelling theoretical framework for 
understanding executive compensation.” (Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)).
3 Zajac and Westphal (1994); Tosi et al. (2000); Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001); Bebchuk and Fried (2003); 
Benz and Stutzer (2003); Schiltknecht (2004); Tosi and Greckhamer (2004); Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005); 
Frey and Osterloh (2005); Wade et al. (2006); Rost and Osterloh (2007).
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(2007); Maucher (2007)) are increasingly critical of this strategy. In their opinion, many 
CEOs receive a far too high a salary for far too low a performance. Pay-for-Performance 
is said to have turned into “Pay-without-Performance” (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). Their 
opinion is based on the following empirical findings (Ettore (1997)):
No incentive effect. A considerable number of empirical research papers show that there 
is actually no relation between the performance-related salary of a CEO and the perfor-
mance of an enterprise4.
No market conformity in terms of salaries. In the United States, between 1990 and 2005 
the average salary of a CEO rose 298% (Anderson et al. (2006)). In Switzerland, since 
2002 CEO income has risen 60%. It is highly questionable whether this development is 
market-related (Rost and Osterloh (2007))5.
Pay-for-Performance as an additional income. On average, companies do not replace part of 
a CEO’s fixed income with variable performance components. Instead, firms pay the vari-
able share, e.g. bonus pay, stocks and stock options, in addition (see Figures 3 and 4).
Figure 3: Pay-for-Performance and increase of salaries of CEOs in S&P 500  
enterprises in USA (Jensen et al. (2004)) 
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4 Marris (1964); Lawler (1971); Herman (1981); Redling (1981); Aoki (1984); Rich and Larson (1984); Dyl 
(1985); Deckop (1988); Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989); Tosi et al. (2000); Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001); 
Dalton et al. (2003); McGuire et al. (2003); Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005); Tosi (2005).
5 The authors show that the manager salaries in Switzerland are at least 30% above the market-related income.
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Figure 4: Pay-for-Performance and increase of salaries of CEOs in 200 SPI  
enterprises in Switzerland (Rost and Osterloh (2007, 47))
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As a consequence, it does not appear that Pay-for-Performance has achieved its targets. 
The explosion of management salaries and the string of financial scandals in big enter-
prises, e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, and Tyco, as well as the present financial market 
crisis, contradict the view that Pay-for-Performance aligns the interests of shareholders 
and management6.
 
3.2	 Wrong	applications	oF	principal-agEnt-thEory
According to Principal-Agent Theory, a well-designed remuneration package for execu-
tives will accomplish three things: it will attract the right executives at the lowest cost, 
retain the right executives at the lowest cost (and encourage executives to leave the firm at 
an appropriate time), and motivate executives to take actions that create long-run share-
holder value and avoid actions that destroy value (Jensen et al. (2004)). However, since 
1990, elements of conflict and negotiation have led to inefficient remuneration packages 
(Jensen et al. (2004)). 
Nonlinear design. Pay-for-Performance is wrong applied because bonuses in enterprise 
practices are mostly nonlinear by design (Holthausen et al. (1995); Jensen et al. (2004)). 
Under the typical bonus plan, no bonus is paid until the CEO achieves a threshold 
6 Some managers and compensation consultants propose that the “war for talents” demands high compensation 
packages (Martin and Moldoveanu (2003)). In their view, the recruitment of highly talented leaders in a global 
economy necessitates the payment of high salaries (Wuffli (2006)).
K. roSt/m. oSterLoh
  
 SBr 61 april 2009  119-149126
performance. The firm pays a threshold bonus for the threshold performance and target 
bonuses for achieving the target performance. Often, there is a cap on bonuses paid. The 
range between the threshold and cap is labelled the “incentive zone”, where incremental 
improvement in performance corresponds to incremental improvement in bonuses. This 
nonlinear design can have detrimentral incentive effects. Managers are able to trade off 
current for future performance by lowering their performance as soon as they realize 
that they cannot meet that year’s threshold (Jensen et al. (2004)). Managers capable of 
performing well above the cap tend to stop producing once they have maximized their 
bonuses. 
Lack of information. Many pay packages and processes are poorly designed because remu-
neration committees routinely lack the information, expertise, and necessary negotiating 
skills (Conyon and Peck (1998); Jensen et al. (2004)). 
Remuneration committees often treat options as being a gift that they are essentially free to 
grant, and the perceived costs of options seem to vary with the number of options granted, 
rather than with the dollar value of the grants, i.e., their cost to the firm. The reason is 
that granting options carries no accounting charge and incurs no outlay of cash. The wide-
spread use of option award plans, in which roughly the same number of share options are 
awarded each year, supports this view. Further, remuneration committees rarely conduct 
market studies of competitive pay levels, or initiate and propose new incentive plans, or 
retain their own compensation experts. Recommendations are made by the management 
working in conjunction with compensation consultants. This lacking independence implies 
that the committee only sees plans that have already been blessed by top managers (Daily 
et al. (1998)). Boards that are looking for new CEOs usually hire a professional recruiting 
firm to identify qualified candidates. Negotiations over pay typically begin only after the 
preferred candidate is identified and told that he is to be the new CEO. At this point, the 
bargaining power shifts to the candidate rather than to the firm. 
3.3	 croWding-out	EFFEcts	oF	intrinsic	motivation
Some opponents of Pay-for-Performance argue that theories based on self-interest 
cannot provide sufficient grounds to analyze motivation of employees, particularly those 
employees, such as CEOs, who perform difficult tasks7. Thus, the idea of enhancing 
performance through pay is, under certain conditions, wrong in itself. This criticism can 
be substantiated by psychological economics (for an overview, see Frey and Benz (2004)), 
and motivation psychology (for an overview, see Deci and Ryan (2000)). Psychological 
economics challenges agency theory’s basic assumptions by proceeding from the ideas of 
bounded rationality and bounded self-interest (Baker (1990)). These theories distinguish 
between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. An action is intrinsically motivated if it is 
performed for its own sake, i.e., out of interest or pleasure or to maintain an internalized 
norm. An action is extrinsically motivated if it is done instrumentally for the purpose of 
7 Davis et al. (1997); Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998); Frey and Osterloh (2002); Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
(2003); Osterloh and Frey (2005b); Frey and Osterloh (2006a); Reberioux (2007).
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achieving a result other than the action itself, e.g., for the purpose of money. The differ-
entiation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation dates back to Atkinson (1964), De 
Charms (1968) and Deci (1975).
Under certain conditions, external incentives, particularly money, crowd out intrinsic 
motivation and have a negative effect on the performance. The conditions are: there 
must exists an intrinsic motivation in the first place, the external incentive is perceived as 
controlling, and the external incentive does not compensate the loss of intrinsic motiva-
tion (Osterloh and Frey (2000)). The so called crowding-out effect (Frey (1997)) is empir-
ically well documented (Frey and Jegen (2001)). Numerous laboratory experiments show 
that monetary rewards for intrinsically motivated tasks lead to a decline in future intrinsic 
motivation (Rummel and Feinberg (1988); Wiersma (1992); Tang and Hall (1995); Deci 
and Ryan (2000); Fehr and Gächter (2000)). Furthermore, field research confirms the 
crowding-out effect (Frey and Jegen (2001); Weibel et al. (2007)). These results contra-
dict the standard economic model. 
The crowding-out effect basically consists of three sub-effects: the overjustification effect, 
the spill-over effect, and the multitasking effect. 
Overjustification effect. If intrinsically motivated persons are caused to act according to 
external control, then their intrinsic motivation is reduced (Deci (1975); Frey and Ober-
holzer-Gee (1997); Deci et al. (1999); Weibel et al. (2007)). Their internal locus of 
causality is replaced by an external locus of causality (De Charms (1968)). They tend to 
enjoy their work less because their autonomy is reduced. If the reduced intrinsic motiva-
tion is not compensated for by external incentives, e.g., money, the performance decreases. 
Using adult populations, Weibel et al. (2007) show in a meta-analysis of Pay-for-Perfor-
mance studies that tangible rewards only have a positive net effect on performance when 
the original intrinsic motivation is low. In contrast, tangible rewards decrease efforts, i.e., 
such rewards have a negative net effect on performance when the original intrinsic moti-
vation is high. Kominis and Emmanuel (forthcoming) support the theory, arguing that 
compared to extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards have a higher positive impact on mana-
gerial motivation at the middle management level8.
 
Spill-over effect. If persons who were previously intrinsically motivated are rewarded monetarily 
for a certain task, then the intrinsic motivation is not only reduced for the task in question, 
but is also transferred to other domains. For example, a child who is rewarded for clearing the 
table will also ask to be rewarded for taking out the garbage (Frey and Osterloh (1997)). Frey 
and Benz (2001) offer experimental evidence for the spill-over effect. Their basic results are 
that in the specific area at which the performance incentives are targeted, there is on average 
a higher effort; but in the area not subject to the incentive mechanism, incentives crowd out 
intrinsically motivated voluntary cooperation. As a consequence of this spill-over effect, total 
efforts over the two areas tend to be reduced when extrinsic incentives are applied.
8 The value of extrinsic rewards is significantly affected by other elements of the evaluation and reward system de-
sign, namely the accuracy of the performance measures and the transparency of the performance measures-re-
wards link.
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Multitasking effect. Pay-for-Performance promotes strategic behavior in people. In other 
words, they will concentrate only on tasks that carry monetary rewards and neglect 
anything else (Holmström and Milgrom (1991); Pfaff et al. (2000); Backes-Gellner et al. 
(2001); Pfaff and Stefani (2003)). For example, transactions that cannot be monitored 
easily, such as organizational citizenship behavior, are ignored (Weibel (2007)). There is 
a huge amount of empirical evidence for CEOs that confirms that Pay-for-Performance, 
especially stock options and bonus payments, promote manipulation.9 Examples are 
“creative accounting” and “cooking the books”10. Murphy (2000) finds that firms that 
tie executive pay to accounting-based performance measures are most likely to show 
evidence of income smoothing, thus supporting the view that executives exert influ-
ence over measures of performance. The multitasking effect has caused stock options to 
become more and more “heroin for managers” (Jensen et al. (2004)). Rynes et al. (2005, 
595) conclude that Pay-for-Performance is “…so powerful that one of the main chal-
lenges is to make sure that compensation systems are not motivating the wrong kinds 
of behaviour…”.
3.4	 adjustmEnt	EFFEcts
In a dynamic perspective, the counterproductive effects of Pay for Performance are rein-
forced by self-selection, strategic reactions, and budget gaming. 
Self-selection. Pay-for-Performance attracts extrinsically motivated persons more than 
intrinsically motivated individuals (Bohnet and Oberholzer-Gee (2000); Backes-Gellner 
and Wolff (2001); Osterloh and Frey (2005a)). Extrinsically motivated employees rein-
force the need for external control measures (Lepper and Greene (1978)). Intrinsically 
motivated persons perceive such a control as unfair and may search for new employment 
(Osterloh et al. (2007)). 
An example of this self-selection-effect is the increasing tendency to fill CEO openings 
through external recruiting rather than through internal promotions. Murphy and Zábo-
jník (2004) show that the proportion of external recruiting has doubled and the recruits’ 
pay premium almost quadrupled over the last 30 years. Unfortunately, the trend to hire 
externally is linked to the decreasing integrity of the predecessor. A possible reason is 
the self-selection effect: CEO positions become less attractive for intrinsically motivated 
persons (Rost et al. (2008)). 
Strategic behavior. Compensation consultants contribute to the abuses in executive pay 
(Wade et al. (1997); Colvin (2001); Jensen et al. (2004)): The compensation consultant’s 
client is most often the CEO, not the firm’s compensation committee. Thus, compensa-
tion consultants make recommendations on the pay of the clients who hire them (Fryer 
9 Osterloh and Frey (2004); Denis et al. (2005); Efendi et al. (2006); Erickson et al. (2006); Johnson et al. (2006); 
Marciukaityte et al. (2006)) or even fraud (Staffelbach (2001); Osterloh and Frey (2004); Denis et al. (2005); 
Efendi et al. (2006); Erickson et al. (2006); Johnson et al. (2006); Marciukaityte et al. (2006); O’Connor et al. 
(2006).
10 Yermack (1997); Aboody and Kasznik (2000); Chauvin and Shenoy (2001); Baker et al. (2003).
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et al. (2003)). Thus, they are inclined to serve the interests of the CEOs. Pay below the 
50th percentile is often labelled “below market”, while pay above the 50th is percentile 
considered “competitive”. As a consequence an “elevator” effect in executive pay levels sets 
in (O’Reilly et al. (1988); Ezzamel and Watson (1998); Bizjak et al. (2000)). The correla-
tion between firm size and executive pay is turned into a causal mechanism that rewards 
managers for increasing the size of the firms, even though they may destroy value in doing 
so (Tosi et al. (2000); Jensen et al. (2004))11. Executives who are affected by the compen-
sation consultant’s executive pay recommendation often engage the consultants in more 
lucrative firm-wide employee-pay-practice areas (Zehnder (2001)). These prospects for 
cross-selling other services increase the conflicts of interest (Jensen et al. (2004)). First, 
it is not realistic to expect a compensation consultant to aggressively argue against over-
paying a CEO. Second, it is not realistic to expect an overpaid CEO to aggressively argue 
against the abuse of pay practices for lower-level employees. For example, the escalation in 
option-based compensation has not been limited to CEOs, but in fact has been extended 
down the corporate hierarchy. However, the efficiency explanation for increased equity 
pay might be relevant to top-level executives who can take direct actions to affect share 
prices, but not to lower-level employees.
Budget gaming. Normally, firms go through an annual budget cycle, in which lower-
level managers submit budgets for targeted outputs in the following year. If managers 
are punished for submitting demanding targets, then they will start to provide informa-
tion necessary to find realistic or more easily achievable targets. Therefore, over the long 
term, bonus plans cause a cycle of manipulations that keep multiplying. Thus, the design 
of many bonus plans does not reward performance, but does reward hiding information 
(Jensen et al. (2004)).
Therefore, we hypothesize that Pay-for-Performance systems often do not ensure that 
managers take optimal actions, and that over time the negative effects will be reinforced 
due to selection effects, strategic behavior of compensation consultants, and budget 
gaming:
Hypothesis 1: Pay-for-Performance reduces performance over the course of time. Today, a 
high pay-for-performance compensation for CEOs is not correlated with firm 
performance and can even reduce firm performance.
4 Method
Our research is based on previous empirical studies that examine the relation between 
variable executive pay and firm performance on numerous different dates. By using 
meta-analysis we can perform a statistical analysis of primary examinations (Hunt 
11 Nearly all studies find an association between size and compensation (Tosi et al. (2000)). However, there is no 
agreement on whether this correlation is to be viewed as indicating management entrenchment, or whether it in-
dicates the complexity of tasks and demands for managerial ability.
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(1997)). As an empirical design, meta-analysis has the following advantages: quanti-
fication of surveys and results, replicability, and impartiality. However, the empirical 
design has several disadvantages: comparability of the surveys; integration of surveys of 
differing quality; “publication bias” in favor of published, significant results; and “non-
independent effects”12 when a survey documents several correlations (Eisend (2004)). 
The disadvantages can be minimized by systematically sampling and by using properly 
applied methods of analysis.
We have considered all previous studies that have been published. First, we searched the 
Business Source Premier, Elsevier, Emerald, and Jstor databases by using the key words 
“executive compensation”, “CEO compensation”, CEO remuneration”, “top management 
compensation”, “tangible rewards”, “equity based compensation”, “high incentives”, “vari-
able compensation”, “pay for performance”, “performance based compensation”, “subse-
quent performance”. Second, we scanned the sources cited within these surveys for further 
studies. Third, we included all surveys identified by previous meta-analyses (Tosi et al. 
(2000); Dalton et al. (2003)).
We use studies that meet the following requirements: (1) The study measures either the 
CEO’s salary or the salary of the top management. (2) The survey takes performance-
dependent salary components into consideration. We designate these components as 
total compensation = fixed salary + bonus plans + shares and option plans, or 
cash compensation = fixed salary + bonus plans, or 
bonus plans and/or 
shares and/or 
option plans.
(3) The survey measures the firm performance either according to the market value of a 
firm or according to accounting-based measurements such as ROA, ROE, or operating 
results. We assigned the different performance measurements according to the survey of 
Tosi et al. (2000) to the market value or rather to the enterprise profit in the books. (4) 
The survey measures the relation between salary and firm performance. 
The final sample comprises 75 empirical studies with n = 123,797 firms13. These studies 
document 259 statistical correlations between CEO-pay and firm performance with 
n = 486,422 observations.
Most surveys do not report bivariate correlation coefficients, but indicate only the t-values 
of the regression coefficients, which are not supposed to be used in meta-analyses. We 
have considered these studies in the analyses and have checked for systematic biases. First, 
there is the danger of systematically biasing the results against economics authors, espe-
cially when such researches are exempted. Economics journals are not likely to demand 
12 For more details see (Eisend (2004)).
13 The actual sample size is smaller than 123,797 firms because some studies use a similar sample of firms. How-
ever, we are not able to count the “real” sample size.
n
n
n
n
n
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that researchers document the correlation coefficients. Second, authors often use analogue 
control variables in regressions, because the correlation between CEO salary and perfor-
mance is one of the most frequently analyzed phenomena. Third, a “controlled” correla-
tion measures the extent of a correlation more accurately.
Year. We code the studies in terms of the time period in which the study measures the 
relation between pay and performance. For panel studies, we determine the average year 
of the time period investigated. 
Type of the Performance Link. To examine the effect of Pay-for-Performance of the CEO 
on firm performance, we distinguish between two frequently applied measures of the link 
between pay and performance. Bonus compensations are meant to increase the short-term, 
accounting-based firm value. Shares and option plans are meant to increase the long-term, 
market-based firm value. In our models we investigate how Pay-for-Performance affects 
either the market-based value of a firm or the accounting-based value of a firm. 
Type of Pay Link. We differentiate between three frequently applied types of incentive pay 
in order to measure their separate incentive effects on performance. In our models we 
investigate how cash-based plans (bonus), equity-based plans (shares/options), or cash- 
and equity-based plans affect performance. 
We also determine the overall correlation between Pay-for-Performance and average 
performance of the firm.
Moderation effects. We check whether the form in which the results are documented (one 
represents the correlation coefficient, two represents the t-value of the regression coeffi-
cient) biases the investigation results systematically.
We perform computations for the meta-analysis by using the Comprehensive Meta Analysis 
(Borenstein (2000)). This software package transforms correlation values into Fisher’s Z, 
uses the approach of Hunter and Schmidt (2004), and allows us to search for sampling 
and measurement errors and range restriction. Before running the analyses, we plot a 
study’s effect size against its standard error. The studies are distributed symmetrically 
around the combined effect size and point out the absence of publication bias. 
For each single study we determine a total effect d, also called Cohen’s d. To ensure an 
acceptable level of independence among studies with multiple subgroups, our unit of anal-
ysis is the study. If a study documents more than one statistic correlation subgroup, we 
summarize these effects first on the level of the single study. We calculate this effect with 
the indication of the correlation coefficient r or with the indication of the t-value of the 
regression coefficient as follows: 
  
di = 2 · ri
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We then calculate an average effect d for the total sample and for each period of inves-
tigation respectively. We assume that an effect of 0.8 is a large effect, an effect of 0.5 is 
average, and an effect factor of 0.2 is small (Rustenbach (2003)). We correct for this effect 
by means of sampling errors. We use Fixed-Effects models as integration models, i.e., the 
correlations are weighted by the sample size of a study. This assumption is based on an 
overall population parameter of all surveys, whereby the effects of a single study randomly 
differ from the error in the overall sample. We calculate the total effect from the study-
specific weights w, as follows:
 
__
 d =  
Ʃ(wi · di)
 _______
Ʃwi
 (2)
To estimate the development of the incentive-effect of Pay-for-Performance over the time 
period, we run a fixed-effect meta-regression analysis. 
We also check our results for their internal homogeneity. A significant Q-value shows 
that we have not taken into account moderator variables, i.e., the dissimilarity between 
the effects in different studies results from sampling errors. We calculate the Q-value as 
follows:
Q =  ∑ 
i = 1
 
k
 wi (wi –  
_
 d )2 (3)
5 results
5.1	 cross-sEctional	modEls
We begin by examining the incentive effect of Pay-for-Performance without consid-
ering the year of investigation. Our analyses determine a correlation between CEO salary 
and performance of d = 0.08*** (Table 1). According to this finding, the variable CEO 
income contributes 0.64% to the increase of the firm performance, in other words a negligible 
amount. Previous investigations find similar results14. Here, the market value of an enter-
prise is increased by d = 0.08*** by shares and option plans, and bonus compensations 
increase the accounting value of a firm by d = 0.07***. Therefore, despite marginal 
differences (z = 5.92**), the incentive effect of both types of performance links appears 
to be equally ineffective. However, a differentiation of both types reduces the heteroge-
neity in the sample (Q-Total = 4357.17***/Q-Bonus-pay = 1248.19***/Q-Equity-pay 
= 2070.59***). This finding indicates moderator variables, such as the time factor. 
Further, a distinction of incentive types shows that (short-term) cash-based plans exert 
a greater influence on performance (d = 0.1***) compared to (long-term) equity-
14 Marris (1964); Lawler (1971); Herman (1981); Redling (1981); Aoki (1984); Rich and Larson (1984); Dyl 
(1985); Deckop (1988); Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989); Tosi et al. (2000); Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001); 
Dalton et al. (2003); McGuire et al. (2003); Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005); Tosi (2005).
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based plans (d = 0.04***). This result contradicts the assumptions of agency theory, 
which suggests that long-term incentive contracts are especially effective in ensuring that 
managers take optimal actions to maximize returns. A mix of cash- and equity-based 
compensation exert a medium influence on performance (d = 0.07***). The magni-
tude of the incentive effect differ significantly (z = 156.69**) and reduces the heteroge-
neity in the sample (Q-Total = 4357.17***/Q-cash-pay = 1365.76***/Q-equity-pay 
= 313.44***/Q-cash & equity-pay = 2590.10***).
Table 1: Results of the meta-analysis fixed-effects model 
Model # Surveys 
# Sub groups
Est. Surv. 
Err.
Z-Value Heterogeneity 
Q-Value
total effect 87 (259) .08*** .001 52.39 4357.17***
method of documenting results:     
correlation 27 (93) .14*** .012 21.08 700.81***
t-Value of the regression coefficient 60 (166) .07*** .000 49.11 3632.98***
group difference    92.17 ***
type of performance link:     
Bonus-based effect: Linking of the ceo salary to 
accounting performance 48 (134) .07*** .004 24.81 1248.19***
equity-based effect: Linking of the ceo salary to 
market performance 39 (125) .08*** .003 34.72 2070.59***
group difference    5.92 **
type of pay link:     
compensation includes cash-based plans (bonus) 47 (116) .10*** .002 39.22 1365.76***
compensation includes equity-based plans 
(stocks/options) 20 (38) .04*** .002 12.56 313.44***
compensation includes cash- and equity-based 
plans 20 (105) .07*** .003 35.00 2590.10***
total    156.69 ***
Significance levels: **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
A systematic bias is considered to be minor. The heterogeneity is reduced only margin-
ally in a differentiated analysis (Q-Total = 4357.17***/Q-Correlation = 700.81***/
Q-t-value = 3632.98***). Studies documenting bivariate correlations determine that 
Pay-for-Performance (d = 0.14***) has a significantly higher incentive effect than do 
studies displaying correlations that are controlled regression-analytically (d = 0.07***). 
This difference is significant (z = 92.17***).
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5.2	 longitudinal	modEls
Figure 5 and Table 2 display the development of the incentive effect of Pay-for-Perform-
ance over time15. The development of the general correlation between variable CEO sala-
ries and firm performance suggests that the Pay-for-Performance was not always ineffective. 
It is rather that the effectiveness decreases over the years (β = –0.003***). According 
to regression results, in 1950 a variable CEO income increased the firm performance at 
d = 0.21. This result is a statistically moderate correlation. Nowadays, salary and perform-
ance are only linked to each other at d = 0.05; an almost nonexistent link. Extrapolating 
these results into the future means that in 2025, a variable CEO salary and firm perform-
ance will not be linked at all anymore (d = zero).
Figure 5: Graphic diagram of the regression results
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forecasting
Over a period of time, Pay-for-Performance has a constant incentive effect of d = 0.07 
on the long-term, market-based value of a firm (β = zero; see Figure 5). The result docu-
mented in the surveys does not change this finding (for the t-value: β = zero). For 
surveys that examine the correlation coefficient, there are not enough cases for reliable 
regression estimations. Therefore, whether and how many options and shares firms give 
their CEOs was and is irrelevant for the firm performance. The time-effect of equity-based 
plans on performance confirms this result: Over time, equity-based plans have a constant 
incentive effect of d = 0.04 on the performance of a firm (β = zero). This tautolog-
ical “correlation” between Pay-for-Performance and the market-based value of a firm is 
substantiated by Jensen et al. (2004). These authors show that the variable salary of CEOs 
consisting of shares and options fluctuates in line with the S&P 500 index. 
15 We verified the regression results by robustness checks because early studies are under-represented and therefore 
might skew the results. When we exclude studies for the years 1950-1960 we obtain similar results. 
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Pay-for-Performance reduces the short-term, accounting-based value of a firm over a 
number of years (β = –0.007***). In 1950, a CEO-bonus caused an impressive increase 
of the firm profit by d = 0.34, but in 2007, a higher CEO bonus causes a slight decline 
of the enterprise profit (d = –0.04). If we extrapolate this result, then the negative 
correlation will be clear in the year 2020 (d = –0.12). Accordingly, the probability of a 
downturn of the accounting-based value of a firm will rise in the future when a bonus is 
granted. The results documented in the surveys do not change this finding (for the t-value: 
β = –0.007***, for correlations: β = –0.011***). The time-effect of bonus-based plans 
on performance confirms that over the long term, equity-based plans have a decreasing 
incentive effect on firm performance (β = –0.005***).
Table 2: Regression results for the fixed-effects model
Regression coefficient Constant Heterogeneity
Model
est. Std.  
err.
Z-
value
est. Std. err. Z-
value
Q-
Value 
model
Tau- 
square
total effect –.003 *** .000 –18.45 6.45 *** .345 18.67 340.46 .008
type of performance link:         
Bonus-based effect: Linking of the 
ceo salary to accounting performance –.007 *** .000 –21.72 13.28 *** .61 21.84 471.64 .007
equity-based effect: Linking of the 
ceo salary to market performance .000 .000 .70 –.41 .63 –.66 .62 .012
method of documenting results:         
correlation –.005 *** .001 –7.40 10.93 *** 1.46 7.495 54.80 .026
t-value of the regression coefficient –.002 *** .000 10.39 4.91 *** .46 10.61 107.84 .011
type of performance link (only  
correlations):         
Bonus-based effect: Linking of the 
ceo salary to accounting performance –.011 *** .000 –13.09 21.20 *** 1.61 13.15 171.24 .015
equity-based effect: Linking of the 
ceo salary to market performance – – – – – – – –
type of performance link (only  
t-values regression coefficient):         
Bonus-based effect: Linking of the 
ceo salary to accounting performance –.007 *** .000 –17.21 12.16 *** .70 17.30 296.03 .005
equity-based effect: Linking of the 
ceo salary to market performance –.000 .000 –.18 .20 .64 .31 .03 .011
type of pay link:         
compensation includes cash-based 
plans (bonus) –.005 *** .000 –15.93 10.81 *** .67 15.93 253.72 .006
compensation includes equity-based 
plans (stocks/options) .000 .000 .17 –.09 .80 –.11 .03 .004
compensation includes cash-   
& equity-based plans –.003 *** .000 –9.66 5.36 *** .55 9.79 93.27 .011
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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5.3	 robustnEss	chEck
To substantiate our findings, we run a robustness check using recent primary data. Our 
database comprises 108 companies quoted on the Swiss Exchange SWX. The sample 
includes the 100 biggest firms measured by market capitalization in the years 2005 and 
2006, i.e., all companies of the Swiss Market Index (SMI) and the biggest companies in 
the Swiss Performance Index (SPI).
We measure executive compensation as the average compensation in Thousend Swiss 
Francs of executive team members in 2005-2006. We calculate the average compensation 
of executive team members as the total earnings divided by the number of people being 
paid in that year. We adjust the number of members to take into account effective atten-
dance in months. We use the salary calculations in the Ethos report (2006). We calcu-
late the value of shares as the number of shares multiplied by the published value of these 
shares. We calculate the value of options with the Black-Scholes model. Figure 6 illustrates 
the level and the composition of executive compensation in our sample.
Figure 6: Executives compensation in 108 Swiss SMI/SPI enterprises 
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Pay-Performance Sensitivity. First, we test the assumption of agency theory, which relates 
the sensitivity of pay to performance, i.e., that changes in shareholder wealth are corre-
lated with changes in executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy (1990a)). Greater pay-
performance-sensitivities indicate greater alignment of executive and shareholder interests. 
In Table 3, we find three indications of interest alignment. A change in the market value 
of a firm increases the total executive compensation in the following year (r = 0.25**). 
Surprisingly, an increase in shareholder wealth increases cash, but not equity, compen-
sation, which we measured as the sum of fixed and bonus pay (r = 0.19**). The last 
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finding is confirmed by the result that an increase in industry-adjusted stock performance 
increases the percentage of cash compensation (r = 0.19*). Moreover, we find many 
indications of missing interest alignment. Most of the correlations between performance 
changes and pay changes are not significant. 
Further, we find three indications that clearly contradict agency theory. An increase 
in stock performance decreases the total amount (r = –0.21*) and the percentage 
(r = –0.34***) of stock compensation. This finding is further confirmed by the result 
that an increase in industry-adjusted stock performance decreases the percentage of stock 
compensation (r = –0.26**). We interpret this finding to mean that in compensation 
practice, the best-paid executives did not perform better; executive compensation practice 
do not use long-term incentives to align the interests of executives and shareholders.
Table 3: Pay-Performance sensitivity of executive compensation16
Change in average executive  
compensation 05- 06:
Log  
Total 
Log  
Cash
Log  
Stocks
Log 
Stock  
Options
%  
Cash
%  
Stocks
%  
Stock  
Options
market firm value in tsd. Sfr (03-05)  .25**  .19**  .06  .00  .17 –.13 –.02
Stock performance (03-05)  .10 –.01  .10 –.21*  .21 –.34***  .14
ind.-adj. stock performance (03-05)  .01  .05  .07 –.15  .19* –.26**  .04
net value added in tsd. Sfr (04)  .18 –.25*  .04 –.19 –.09 –.05  .11
* p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, N = 108.
Pay-for-Performance Link. Second, we test the agency theory assumption that individuals 
are motivated by incentives. From this viewpoint, an optimal incentive contract makes 
the agent’s compensation contingent on outcomes desired by the principal (Fong and 
Tosi (2007)). In Table 4, we find no indications for positive incentive effects. Most of 
the correlations between pay and performance are not significant. We find several indi-
cations that clearly contradict with agency theory. A higher amount (–0.16*/–0.22**/ 
–0.19**) and a higher percentage (–0.17*/–0.22**) of variable pay, measured as the 
sum of bonus and equity pay, decreases firm performance in the long run. Further, a 
higher percentage of stock options also decreases firm performance in the long run 
(–0.18*/–0.18*). According to these findings, highly contingent or long-term incentive 
contracts do not motivate, but rather de-incentivize, CEOs to work in the interest of their 
company. We even find a negative correlation between total executive compensation and 
expected firm performance, which we measure as the performance expectations of business 
16 We calculate Stock performance as a percentage, using the differences between stock performance over a set pe-
riod of time. We calculate Industry-adjusted stock performance as a percentage, using the Swiss Performance In-
dexes of each industry (SPI) sector end of the year (published by the Swiss Exchange SWX). We measure Net 
value added as the Sharpe ratio 2004 multiplied by the market capitalization on January 1, 2004, according to 
corporate action /dividends/ reduction or increase in capital stock. The Sharpe ratio 2004 equals the yield on in-
vestment 2004 minus market rate of return 2004 with beta risk 1.1.2004.
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analysts (–0.2**). Thus, higher amounts of executive compensations do not necessarily 
increase shareholder wealth, but have the potential to decrease shareholder wealth. 
Table 4: Pay-for-Performance link of executive compensation17
Average executive  
compensation 05/06:
Log  
Total 
Log  
Fixed
Log  
Vari-
able
Log  
Bonus
Log  
Stocks
Log  
Stock  
Options
%  
Variable
%  
Bonus
%  
Stocks 
%  
Stock  
Options
Past stock  
performance:
*03-05 –.05 –.05 –.04 –.01 –.18* –.07  .00 –.01 –.07  .10
*ind-adj. 03-05 –.01 –.05  .04  .02 –.12 –.00  .08  .03 –.07  .14
future stock 
performance:
*05-08 –.10 –.08 –.02 –.07  .09 –.12  .04  .07  .10 –.14
*ind-adj. 05-08 –.00  .04  .08 –.03  .08  .01  .05 –.11  .09  .15
*07-08 –.08  .03 –.08  .00  .11 –.07 –.07 –.03  .07 –.12
*ind-adj. 07-08 –.05  .03 –.04 –.01  .08 –.03 –.04 –.06  .07 –.03
*11/07-01/08 –.09  .09 –.16* –.04  .06 –.11 –.17* –.04  .01 –.18*
*ind-adj. 11/07-01/08 –.15  .10 –.22** –.10  .02 –.10 –.22** –.05 –.04 –.18*
expected 
performance:
*P/E ratio 08&09 –.20** –.07 –.19** –.16* –.08 –.07 –.07 –.05 –.04 –.00
* p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, N = 108.
6 Why does Pay-For-PerForMance stay in Fashion?
We have shown that in the long run, Pay-for-Performance has no positive incentive effect. 
Our results indicate that executive pay has become decoupled from firm performance. 
Given these facts, two questions arise that we believe are essential for further research and 
compensation practice. 
6.1	 Why	did	bonus	paymEnts,	Which	arE	linkEd	to	thE	accounting-basEd	
valuE	oF	a	Firm,	initially	opEratEd	positivEly?
When they first appear, management fashions often cause a kind of optimism and excite-
ment: “...managers apply them successfully in order to flatter, inspire and demand or to 
induce actions...” (Kieser and Hegele, (1998, 40) referring to Eccles and Nohria (1992)). 
17 We calculate Stock performance as a percentage, using the differences between stock performance over a set pe-
riod of time. We calculate Industry-adjusted stock performance as a percentage, using the Swiss Performance In-
dexes of each industry (SPI) sector end of the year (published by the Swiss Exchange SWX). We measure expect-
ed performance by expected Price-Earnings Ratio of business analysts of the ZKB (Züricher Kantonalbank).
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A new management fashion motivates firms to test new solutions. As people become 
increasingly convinced that a management fashion works, they are less likely to seek or 
notice evidence to the contrary. Positive feedback processes dominate these dynamics, 
leading to rapid adoption of those new ideas lucky enough to gain a sufficient initial 
following (Sterman and Wittenberg (1999)). Pay-for-Performance can be interpreted as a 
management fashion that initially had positive effects.
6.2	 Why	pay-For-pErFormancE	is	still	appliEd	and	rEcEntly	Why	has	it	EvEn	
bEEn	transFErrEd	to	organizations	that	arE	not	proFit-oriEntEd?
Numerous firms are aware of the questionable effects of Pay-for-Performance. A 2004 
survey of 350 companies showed that 83% of all organizations believe that their Pay-
for-Performance programs are either only somewhat successful or not successful at all at 
accomplishing their goals (Hewitt Associates News & Information (2004)). Neverthe-
less, firms do not abolish the systems once they have been introduced. In addition, many 
authorities have adopted Pay-for-Performance under the concept of “New Public Manage-
ment”, even for physicians and judges. Pay-for-Performance has even been introduced for 
researchers at universities, e.g., by means of periodical evaluations in which publications 
and citations are counted. The effects are as counterproductive as they are for corporate 
CEOs. For physicians, treating seriously ill patients becomes unattractive (Osterloh and 
Rost (2005)). Bøgh Andersen (2007) show that there is a crowding-out effect of intrinsic 
motivation among dentists. Judges react with less thorough verdicts (Schneider (2007)). 
And scientists react strategically: they increase the number of their publications at the cost 
of the quality of their research (Frey (2003); Frey and Osterloh (2006b)). 
Further research is needed to explain why the adoption of Pay-for-Performance is 
increasing despite its obvious failures. Recent research offers three suggestions that partly 
overlap. First, Ghoshal (2005) laments the fact that in the training of new managers 
at reputable MBA centers, the prevalence of standard economic approaches leads to a 
situation in which these theories’ conception of human beings as opportunists tends to 
become reality. Managers apply what they have learned in their MBA lessons, namely, 
that it would be naïve to assume that people are benevolent and work voluntarily in the 
interest of their company. Thus, they have to be motivated extrinsically and the exclu-
sionary effect of intrinsic motivation sets in. As a consequence, wrong theories guide 
management and policy decisions (Ghoshal and Moran (1996)). Second, Ferraro, Pfeffer, 
and Sutton (2005) state that in social sciences, theory becomes a normative guidance on 
how to act, which itself sets a self-fulfilling prophecy in motion. In their view, this self-
fulfilling prophecy is true of economics. The authors draw on Robert Merton’s definition 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy as one that “is, in the beginning, a false definition of a situa-
tion evoking a behavior which makes the originally false conception come true” (Merton 
(1948)). Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton (2005) analyze three mechanisms through which 
theories become self-fulfilling: institutional designs, e.g., reward systems, measurement 
practices, and selection processes that reflect the theories of their designers; social norms, 
e.g., obeying the norm of self-interest so as not to appear foolish; and language, e.g., 
evoking different cognitive frames, such as the gain frame or a pro-social frame. Third, 
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neo-institutional organization theory (Meyer and Rowan (1977); Walgenbach and Beck 
(2003)) and path-dependency theory (Schreyögg and Sydow (2003)) argue that it would 
false to assume that shareholders can “pick and mix” an optimal compensation contract 
for CEOs (Buck and Shahrim (2005)). In particular, national culture and antecedent insti-
tutions are important contingencies. Key actors have low absorptive capacity, and little 
ability to quickly unlearn embedded routines and work templates. Firms adopt measures 
like Pay for Performance, which initially improved the performance of some organizations, 
even though they have not proven to be effective. Nevertheless, such management fashions 
are considered as features of modern thinking – until the next new fashion comes along. 
7 liMitations and conclusion
Our study has some important limitations.
First, meta-analyses do not allow using a fixed-effect approach. A fixed-effect approach 
would increase the generalizability of the findings by addressing the important concern of 
accounting for unchanging firm- or country-specific components. Second, in the meta-
analysis, our dependent variable is sometimes overall CEO compensation rather then the 
incentive compensation of CEOs. More finely grained data would clearly be preferable. 
Third, our empirical design, using a meta-analysis and a cross-sectional analysis within 
one country, has disadvantages. It would be illuminating to conduct longitudinal studies 
on different firms and in countries and examine the conditions under which the pay-for-
performance link increases or declines. The generalization of our findings clearly repre-
sents areas for further research. 
Overall, the results of this study show that Pay-for-Performance has counterproductive 
effects, especially for CEO,s and like most fashions does not provide solutions to its 
intended goals. Future research should examine why it is still applied. 
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